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Abstract
Attempts to use commodities to construct theories of value and
use such value theory to claim that, in capitalism, commodities can
be exploited, just like labour is, rest on two conceptual flaws: (a) failure to distinguish between labour and labour-power; and (b) failure
to distinguish labour-power and other commodities. One way to avoid
these conceptual mistakes is to use the labour theory of value.
Keywords: labour theory of value; generalized commodity exploitation theorem.
JEL Codes: B51.
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Introduction

The Marxian labour theory of value rests on the argument that labour is the
substance of value (Marx, 1992, chapter 1). In the first volume of Capital,
Marx refined and extended the classical labour theory of value (LTV) and
used it to demonstrate that capitalism rests on the exploitation of the working
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class, or the exploitation of labour by capital. Marx’s demonstration relied
crucially on distinguishing between labour-power, the human capacity to do
useful work, and labour, the actual input in the production process that
arises when labour-power is used. Marx argued that what the capitalist
purchases, and the worker sells, on the labour marekt is labour-power and
not labour. On average, the capitalist purchases labour-power at its value
and yet ends up with surplus value because the value added by labour-power
(what the capitalist gets) is greater than the value of labour-power (what
the capitalist pays for). The difference is the surplus value that is realized
through the sale of commodities and distributed across capitalist society in
the form of profit of enterprise, interest and rent.
An influential strand of what I will call Analytical Marxist (AM) thinking, for lack of a better term, has challenged this understanding with an
argument that consists of at least two key claims: first, that any basic commodity can be used to construct a consistent value theory, where a basic
commodity is understood as one which is used directly or indirectly to produce all commodities - let us call this a commodity theory of value (CTV);
and second, that the basic commodity that is used to construct a CTV is
exploited in a capitalist economy - let us call this a commodity exploitation
theorem (CET).
The implication of the first claim is that there is nothing special in labour
so far as it can be considered the substance of value. Basic commodities can
as well function as a substance of value. Hence, just like we have the labour
theory of value, we can also have a peanut theory of value if only we agree
that peanuts are basic commodities (Gintis and Bowles, 1981, Appendix I).
The implication of the second claim is even more striking. Just as labour
is understood to be exploited by capital when we use a Marxian LTV, it
can be equally well demonstrated that when a basic commodity is chosen as
the candidate substance of value, that basic commodity is also necessarily
exploited in a capitalist economy if we use a CTV (Gintis and Bowles, 1981;
Roemer, 1982). Hence, labour does not have a special function to play even
in a theory of exploitation (Roemer, 1982, 1985).1
In this paper, I will critically evaluate both of the above claims. The
main finding of this critical scrutiny is that these claims rest on elementary
1
For an excellent survey of the debate on exploitation theory since the seminal contribution of Nobuo Okishio in the 1960s, see Yoshihara (2017). The second claim of the
CTV is called the generalized commodity exploitation theorem by Yoshihara (2017) and
the commodity exploitation theorem by Fujimoto and Fujita (2008).
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conceptual flaws. The problem with the first claim is that it does not properly
distinguish between labour and labour-power - a distinction that is key in
Marxian political economy. The problem with the second claim is that it
does not correctly distinguish between labour-power and other commodities
- another key idea in Marxist economics. These flaws nullify the two claims
and highlight the conceptual problems associated with attempts to construct
commodity theories of value and/or to use them to advance claims about
commodity exploitation. Hence, this critique, if it is valid, paves the way for
reconsidering labour as the only substance of value.
The argument in this paper is related to, but also different from, earlier
attempts to provide a critique of the CET. Two contributions are worth
mentioning in this regard. Fujimoto and Fujita (2008) provide a refutation
of the CET by arguing that the result is just a numerical representation of
the productiveness of the ‘complete matrix’ captured by the Hawkins-Simon
condition.2 Such a technical condition does not have anything to do with
exploitation, which is a social phenomenon, they rightly note. Yoshihara
and Veneziani (2013) argue in a similar vein that exploitation should be
understood in social and not in technological terms - which is what the
CET does. Drawing on their previous work, they offer a new definition of
exploitation that undermines the implication of the CET for exploitation
theory.3
Both of these, and similar, contributions are important in that they offer
critiques of the CET. In this paper, I offer a different and simpler critique
of the CET. I argue that even if the notion of commodity value, as defined
in Gintis and Bowles (1981) and Roemer (1982, appendix 6.1), is legitimate
as a technical construct, it cannot be used to show that commodities are
exploited. Trying to use the technical concept of commodity value to advance
claims about the exploitation of commodities is conceptually flawed because
such an attempt commits a category error. It attaches the surplus value
generated by labour-power to a commodity like food or steel, when, in fact,
such accounting cannot be justified on the basis of any logic.
I highlight the category error in AM thinking by juxtaposing two different
intuitions about value. One intuition of value is what might be called an
‘embodied substance of value’ intuition. Using this intuition, we understand
that the value of any commodity is equal to the amount of the substance of
2
3

The so-called complete matrix is discussed below.
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value embodied in a unit of the commodity. A second intuition of value is
what might be called the ‘value transferred and value added’ intuition. If we
use this intuition, we can assert that the value of any commodity is equal
to the value transferred by, and the value added by, the production inputs.
In the case of the LTV, both intuitions line up; in the case of CTV, the
intuitions diverge. We can only make them coincide, I argue in this paper,
by committing a category error, as do scholars who try to establish that
commodities can be exploited. Both Gintis and Bowles (1981) and Roemer
(1982, Appendix 6.1) had worked with the first intuition of value. They had
not checked whether their formulation was in line with the second intuition.
That might be one reason why the category error was hidden from view in
these contributions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, I summarize
some key propositions of the AM traditions so far as it relates to a commodity
theory of value and commodity exploitation; in section 3, I argue that only
labour is a basic in the AM sense; in section 4, I highlight the category error
associated with propositions that claim to establish commodity exploitation;
I conclude the discussion in the last section.

2

Summary of a Commodity Theory of Value

A key ingredient of a CTV is the notion of a ‘basic’.
We define an input into production to be a basic if it enters directly or indirectly (via its being an input into another production input) into the production of all commodities. (Gintis and
Bowles, 1981, pp. 18).
With this definition in place, the CTV can be presented in terms of four
propositions (Gintis and Bowles, 1981, Appenidix I).
• Proposition 1: If the wage rate is positive, then labor is not the only
basic in the economy.
• Proposition 2: Any basic commodity is a consistent basis for value
theory.
• Proposition 3: Any marketed input into the production of commodities
whose valorization process lies outside the site of capitalist production
may have the same form of price equation as that of labor-power.
4

• Proposition 4: Any basic resource can be considered an acceptable basis
for value theory.
The first proposition attempts to show that once we abstract from the
physical characteristics of commodities, labour is still not the only production
input that is common to all commodities. Hence, this proposition, if correct,
would nullify Marx’s claim in Chapter 1, Volume I of Capital that labour
should be considered a true basis of value because it is the only thing that is
common to all commodities (considered from the perspective of production).
The second proposition shows that any basic commodity can be a consistent
basis for constructing a value theory. To be precise, this means that we can
demonstrate the following proposition: the rate of profit is positive if and
only if the basic commodity is exploited.4 Since the first proposition has
established that there will always be some basic (because the wage rate is
bound to be positive), the two propositions, taken together, show that we can
always find an alternative basis for value theory, i.e. alternative to labour.
Any basic commodity can be used to construct a value theory and to show
that, in a capitalist economy, existence of positive profit is equivalent to the
exploitation of the basic commodity.
Following Gintis and Bowles (1981, pp. 19), if we understand the second
proposition as demonstrating, further, that “the distinction between the usevalue of labour-power to the capitalist and its exchange value cannot serve to
demonstrate that labour is the only proper basis for value theory”, then we
should look for some other respect in which labour is different from commodities and then use that to construct a value theory. One key difference that
we can identify relates to the pricing of commodities. For all commodities,
the price of production is the sum of the cost-price and profit (calculated
with the uniform rate of profit) on the cost-price.5 But the price of labourpower does not include the element of profit; its price is simply its cost-price.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that any marketed input that lies outside the valorization process associated with capitalist commodity production will have
the same form of price equation as labour-power. One example of such a
marketed input would be land. Proposition 4 then demonstrates, in parallel
to Proposition 2, that such a marketed input, e.g. land, can also form the
basis of a value theory. Taken together, the third and fourth propositions
4

Recall that this proposition in the case of labour is known as the Fundamental Marxian
Theorem (Morishima, 1973).
5
Cost-price is the sum of constant capital and variable capital (Marx, 1993).
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show that even the “noncommodity attribute of wage labour . . . is not sufficient to justify labour as the proper basis for value theory.” (Gintis and
Bowles, 1981, pp. 19).
To summarize: Proposition 1 and 2 demonstrate, according to Gintis
and Bowles (1981), that the unique feature of labour-power as a commodity
cannot justify using labour as the only basis of value theory; Proposition 3
and 4 close off the option of turning to the noncommodity attribute of wage
labour to justify the use of labour as the basis of value theory. Taken together,
the four propositions demolish the claim of labour being the sole basis of a
consistent theory of value and of showing that only labour is exploited in
capitalism.

3

Elements of the Wage Bundle are not Basics

Proposition 1 is key in establishing the chain of claims captured by the four
propositions given above. Hence, I will begin by carefully studying its rather
simple and short proof.
We shall assume that labour is a basic input. If the wage rate is
positive, then there is some commodity or resource in the wage
bundle. This commodity or resource is thus indirectly embodied
in any commodity produced by labour. Thus, any element of the
wage bundle is also a basic. It follows that labour is not the only
basic (Gintis and Bowles, 1981, pp. 19).
The key step in the proof is the following sentence: “This commodity or
resource is thus indirectly embodied in any commodity produced by labour.”
Is this statement true? To be concrete, let us suppose that the wage bundle
has a commodity called ‘food’. This simply means that ‘food’ is consumed by
the worker, i.e. ‘food’ is used to produce labour-power, the human capacity to
do useful work. In the labour market, labour-power is sold to the capitalist for
a wage. When labour-power is used, we get labour, the input into production.
Thus, what is produced by ‘food’ and sold on the labour market is different
from what is the input in production. This means that ‘food’ is not a ‘basic’
as defined above by Gintis and Bowles (1981). This is because ‘food’ is not
used to produce labour. Hence, Proposition 1 is invalid.
6

The key error in the proof of Proposition 1 is the inability to distinguish
between labour-power and labour. It is useful to recall that labour-power
is the human capacity to do useful work; and labour is what we get when
that capacity is actually used in a production process. In a capitalist society,
labour-power is the commodity that is sold on the labour market, not labour.
In the production process, labour-power is used and that adds labour to the
objects of labour. The claim that any element of the wage bundle is a basic
gives up this crucial conceptual difference between labour-power and labour.
Two further points about Proposition 1 are worth highlighting. First, the
definition of a basic input in Gintis and Bowles (1981) is different from the
one used by Sraffa (1960). For Sraffa,
[t]he criterion is whether a commodity enters (no matter whether
directly or indirectly) into the production of all commodities.
Those that do we shall call basic, and those that do not, nonbasic products. (Sraffa, 1960, pp. 6, emphasis in original).
By this definition, a basic is always a commodity; Sraffa’s definition of a
basic product does not include non-commodities. Hence, Sraffa’s definition
of a basic product is a technical property of the input-output coefficient matrix, i.e. whether the input-output coefficient matrix is irreducible (Pasinetti,
1977, pp. 104–105). Gintis and Bowles (1981) move away from Sraffa’s definition and include a non-commodity, labour, in the category of a basic. The
motivation for this expanded definition seems to be to subsequently argue,
in Proposition 1, that any element of the wage bundle is also a basic. But as
we have seen above, such an argument is invalid.6
Second, it is important to recall that classical political economists before
Marx had not been able to conceptually distinguish between labour-power
and labour. The inability to distinguish between labour-power and labour
led to the failure of political economists before Marx to clearly understand
the source of surplus value. This point was highlighted by F. Engels in his
introduction to Marx’s 1849 pamphlet, Wage Labour and Capital, when it
was published in 1891.
Before we proceed, it is important to note the implication of the argument
I have presented in this section. I have shown that the claim made by Gintis
6

It is interesting to note that L. Pasinetti makes the same error: “Notice that, as a
consequence of the hypothesis that all commodities require labour, directly or indirectly, to
be produced, wage goods are necessarily basic commodities.” (Pasinetti, 1977, footnote 4,
pp. 124).
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and Bowles (1981) that any element of the wage bundle is a basic is false.
This means that, following their definition, there is only one basic: labour.
This is because labour is a direct production input into the production of all
commodities.
If my critique of Proposition 1 is accepted, then it also means that Proposition 2 loses its force - because Proposition 2 requires the theoretical support
of Proposition 1: if one cannot demonstrate that there exists some basic other
than labour, then the claim that a basic (other than labour) can be a consistent basis of value theory is vacuous. Hence, the fact that Proposition 1
is false nullifies the whole chain of claims that comprise the CTV. While I
note this to draw attention of the reader, I will nonetheless proceed to develop a critique of a key component of Proposition 2 in this paper, viz. the
claim that commodities can be exploited. I do so for two reasons. First, the
claim about commodity exploitation has been presented in the literature as
a stand-alone result and is often referred to as the commodity exploitation
theorem.
Marx believed that labour power was the commodity which produced a surplus under capitalism. In this appendix I show that
one can define embodied value in terms of any commodity numeraire, with the result that the technology is productive if and
only if each commodity is exploited when it is taken as numeraire.
Steel is exploited if the steel value embodied in a unit of steel is
less than one. Labour power is not special in having this property.
(Roemer, 1982, Appendix 6.1, pp. 186)
Hence, a critical engagement with this part of the second proposition is called
for irrespective of the status of Proposition 1. Second, Proposition 2 highlights another conceptual flaw that animates attempts to construct any CTV:
the inability to distinguish between labour-power and all other commodities.

4

A Critique of Commodity Exploitation

In this section, I will first evaluate the validity of the claim that commodities can be exploited by working with a simple example discussed in Gintis
and Bowles (1981, pp. 19) where the economy produces 2 commodities. In
the following sub-section, I will discuss a more general version of the same
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claim that is presented in Roemer (1982, Appendix 6.1). I will highlight the
conceptual error in both versions of the argument.

4.1
4.1.1

Commodity Value: A 2-Commodity Economy
The Set-up

The economy in this example has two goods, food (F) and jewelry (J), where
F is a basic and J is not. The technology for producing the two goods are
specified as follows:
Food is used to produce all goods, and is in the wage bundle,
while jewelry is consumed only by nonworkers and is not used in
production (i.e. it is not a basic). Specifically, suppose 1/2 bushel
of F and 1/2 hour of labour are used to produce one bushel of F,
and 1/2 bushel of food is in the wage bundle. Also suppose 1/4
bushel of food and one hour of labour is used to produce one unit
of J. (Gintis and Bowles, 1981, pp. 19).
4.1.2

Labour Values: Definition and Two Intuitions

Let ΛF , ΛJ and ΛLP represent the labour values of food, jewelry and labourpower. From the specification of the technology for producing F and J, and
the fact that the real wage bundle contains 1/2 units of food, we see that
their labour values must be determined by the following equations,

and

1
ΛF
+ = ΛF ,
2
2

(1)

ΛF
+ 1 = ΛJ ,
4

(2)

and

ΛF
.
(3)
2
On solving the three equations, (1), (2), and (3), we get: ΛF = 1, ΛJ =
5/4, ΛLP = 1/2. Thus, the labour value of food is 1, the labour value of
jewelry is 5/4, and the labour value of labour-power is 1/2.
These equations capture two different intuitions about the concept of
labour value. The first intuition is what I will call the ‘embodied substance
ΛLP =

9

of value’ intuition. It comes from the idea that the labour value of one unit of
any commodity is the total magnitude of labour embodied in one unit of the
commodity, and that the latter is the sum of the direct and indirect amounts
of labour needed to produce it (Steedman, 1977, pp. 40). For instance, in
(1), the labour value of one unit of F , ΛF , is the sum of the amount of direct
labour, 1/2, and the amount of indirect labour, ΛF /2, used in the production
of 1 unit of F . The same logic holds for the equation determining the value of
jewelry, ΛJ , in (2). Finally, the value of labour-power, ΛF /2, is equal to ΛF /2
because the wage bundle has 1/2 units of F . The implicit understanding is
that in the production of labour-power, value accounting will only include the
indirect input, food (F ), because the labour that is used in the production of
labour-power falls outside the domain of capitalist commodity production.
A different intuition is also embedded in the above equations (1), (2) and
(3) that I would like to call a ‘value transferred and value added intuition’.
According to this intuition, the value of one unit of the output is equal to
the sum of the value transferred by the non-labour inputs used up and the
value added by labour in producing one unit of the commodity (Marx, 1992,
Chapter 8). For instance, in the production of F , the non-labour input
transfers ΛF /2 units of value and the labour input (i.e. use of labour-power)
adds 1/2 units of value. This second intuition is important because it allows
us to clearly see the source of surplus value. The value added by labour-power
is larger than the value of labour-power, and this difference is the source
of surplus value. For instance, in the production of food, the value added
by labour-power is 1/2, but the value of labour-power is ΛLP /2. Hence, the
surplus value generated in the production of food is given by (1/2 − ΛLP /2) =
1/4. The same intuition applies to the equation determining the value of
jewelry, i.e. (2).
4.1.3

Food Values: First Intuition

Let us now follow Gintis and Bowles (1981) and use food as the substance
of value. We can do so, according to Gintis and Bowles (1981), because food
is a basic, i.e. it is used directly or indirectly in producing all commodities.
This means that we can meaningfully define the value of all commodities
in terms of food. Let µF , µJ , µLP denote the F-value (food value) of food,
jewelry and labour-power, respectively.
According to the first intuition discussed above, the F-value of any commodity is the sum of the direct and indirect amounts of food used in pro10

ducing 1 unit of the commodity. Using the technology for food production
given above, we can implement this definition through the following value
determination equation for food as,
1 µLP
+
= µF .
2
2

(4)

Here the direct input of food is 1/2 and the indirect input of food is µLP /2.
In a similar way, we can implement the definition of the food value of jewelry,
using information about the technology of jewelry production, as,
1
+ µLP = µJ .
4

(5)

Since the wage bundle has 1/2 bushel of food, we finally get the value equation
for labour-power as,
1
(6)
µLP = .
2
Solving the three equations in (4), (5) and (6), we get µF = 3/4, µJ = 3/4,
and µLP = 1/2. Thus, we see that the F-value of every commodity is a
positive number. Moreover, these calculations show that the F-value of food
is less than 1 (because µF = 3/4). This is interpreted by Gintis and Bowles
(1981, pp. 19) as demonstrating that food (the basic input, in this case) is
exploited. To complete their argument, Gintis and Bowles (1981) show that a
positive profit rate is implied by and implies positive exploitation of the basic
commodity. But that demonstration is not relevant for my argument. I want
to look critically only at the argument that has apparently demonstrated that
‘food’ is exploited. To do so, I will return to the calculation of F-values and
look at the equations determining F-values of commodities using the second
intuition.
4.1.4

Food Values: Second Intuition

Let us start with the equation for the determination of the F-value of food
given in (4): 1/2 + µLP /2 = µF . Let us look at the left hand side (LHS)
of this equation from the perspective of value transferred and value added.
Since 1/2 units of food is used as an input, and since each unit of food has
F-value of µF , the F-value transferred by food is µF /2. Similarly, 1/2 units of
labour-power is used in production. We know that each unit of labour-power
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has F-value of µLP . Hence the F-value transferred by labour-power is µLP /2.
Thus, total F-value transferred by the two inputs is given by µF /2 + µLP /2.
Comparing with (4), we see the following: if we add 1/2−µF /2 and µF /2+
µLP /2 (total F-value transferred by the two inputs), we get the expression on
the LHS of (4). This means that, in the production of food, surplus F-value
of 1/2 − µF /2 units has been generated - because this amount of F-value is
in excess of the F-value transferred by both inputs. Note immediately that
surplus F-value is positive if and only if µF < 1. Hence, if we can show that
µF < 1, as was shown by Gintis and Bowles (1981) and as we have confirmed
in the example above, then we are justified in claiming that surplus F-value
has been generated. But the fact that µF < 1 does not allow us to answer
the question as to which commodity is exploited. To answer that question,
we need to figure out the answer to another question: does food add this
surplus F-value or does labour-power add this surplus F-value? If it is the
former then we would be justified in claiming that food is exploited; if it is
the latter, we will not be so justified.
The first option is to argue that labour-power adds the surplus F-value.
In this case, we could rearrange (4) and write it as,


µLP
1
µF
+
+ (1 − µF ) = µF ,
(7)
2
2
2
which clearly shows that the F-value added by labour-power, the term in the
square bracket, is larger than the F-value of labour-power, µLP /2. In this
case, the fact that µF < 1 does not imply that food is exploited. In fact,
in this case, since labour-power adds the surplus F-value, we are justified in
asserting that labour is exploited (even though we compute values in units
of food). Hence, the claim of Gintis and Bowles (1981) that µF < 1 implies
that food is exploited is false.
The second option is to argue that food adds the surplus F-value. In this
case, we could rearrange (4) and write it as,


1
µLP
µF
+ (1 − µF ) +
= µF ,
(8)
2
2
2
which shows that the F-value added by food, the term in the square bracket,
is larger than the F-value of food, µF /2. If this is the case, then we are
certainly justified in claiming that food is exploited. But it is not legitimate
to claim that food adds the surplus F-value. To claim that food adds the
12

surplus F-value would imply that food adds more F-value than it has. But
this is absurd: food cannot add more F-value than food has. I look at this
argument in greater detail in section 4.3 below. Here let us understand the
nature of the error that underlies the claim that food is exploited.
In using equation (4) to claim that food is exploited, one is implicitly
confounding terms, i.e. one is making a category error. Instead of attaching
the surplus F-value that is generated by the use of labour-power to the commodity labour-power, we are instead attaching that surplus F-value to the
commodity food. It is this confounding of terms, this category error, that
generates the surprising result: food is exploited.
The same reasoning applies to the equation for determining the F-value
of jewelry. To begin, note that in the production of jewelry, the F-value
transferred by food is µF /4 and the F-value of labour-power is µLP . With
these magnitudes in mind, we can see that equation (5) can be equally written
as


1
µF
+ µLP + (1 − µF ) = µJ
4
4
and also as




1
µF
+ (1 − µF ) + µLP = µJ .
4
4

In the first version, we are correctly attaching the surplus F-value, 1/4 −
µLP /4, to the commodity labour-power; in the second, we are incorrectly
attaching the surplus F-value to the commodity food. The second version is
what takes us to (5) and the claim that food is being exploited, and it is now
clear why that is conceptually problematic.

4.2
4.2.1

Commodity Value: An n-Commodity Economy
Basic Set-up

The above argument about the conceptual problems of using commodities as
the substance of value and then claiming that that commodity is exploited
can be demonstrated in a more formal setting. Consider a capitalist economy with n sectors, each producing a single commodity using labour and
all commodities. There are no joint products and there is no fixed capital.
The technical conditions of production in each sector is taken as given and

13

is captured by the n × n matrix of

a11
 a21

A=

an1

input-output coefficients,

a12 · · · a1n
a22 · · · a2n 


..

.
an2 · · · ann

and the corresponding 1 × n vector of direct labour inputs


L = L1 L2 · · · Ln
where aij is the physical magnitude of the i-th commodity used to produce
1 unit of the j-th commodity, and Lj is the quantity of direct labour used
to produce 1 unit of commodity j. Let Let b denote the n × 1 vector of the
real wage bundle per hour of labour-power sold, and let the augmented input
matrix be defined as,
M = A + bL,
and assume that M is nonnegative and productive, as is standard in the
literature (Roemer, 1981).7
I will follow Roemer (1982) and define values in terms of commodity 1
(the commodity is called ‘steel’). Let the 1 × (n + 1) vector,


µ = µ1 µ2 · · · µn µn+1 ,
denote the S-values (steel values) of all commodities, and where, in particular,
µn+1 is the S-value of labour-power. Following Roemer (1982), we display
the technology as follows,


a11 a12 · · · a1n b1
 a21 a22 · · · a2n b2 



..
..
..
..  ,
A =  ...
.
.
.
.


an1 an2 · · · ann bn 
L1 L2 · · · Ln 0
where the first row and first column refer to steel, the chosen substance of
value.8 In this representation of technology, Roemer (1982) notes that
7

The non-negative matrix M is said to be productive if there exists a nonnegative
−1
column vector, x ≥ 0, such that x > M x. If M is productive, then (I − M ) > 0,
where I is the identity matrix of the correct dimensions (Pasinetti, 1977, appendix).
8
This matrix is called the ‘complete matrix’ in Bródy (1970), as noted by Fujimoto and
Fujita (2008).
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[the] j th column of this array lists the inputs of all (n + 1) commodities used as inputs into production of the j th good - and
this statement is true also for j = n + 1, namely, the commodity
labour power. The ith row lists the inputs of the ith good into the
various processes - and this statement is true also for i = n + 1,
namely the input of labour. (Roemer, 1982, pp. 187).
In the above array, the (n + 1) × (n + 1) entry is 0 because labour is not
an input into the production of labour-power, i.e. labour-power is produced
outside the framework of capitalist commodity production.
4.2.2

Steel Value: First Intuition

Let us calculate S-values according to the first intuition: value of one unit of
any commodity is the sum of the direct and indirect amount of steel needed
to (re)produce it. For the first n commodities, we have
µj = a1j + (µ2 a2j + · · · + µn anj + µn+1 Lj ) ,

j = 1, 2, . . . , n,

(9)

where a1j is the direct amount of steel and µ2 a2j + · · · + µn anj + µn+1 Lj is
the indirect amount of steel needed to produce 1 unit of the j-th commodity.
For the n + 1-st commodity, i.e. labour-power, we have,
µn+1 = b1 + (µ2 b2 + · · · + µn bn ) ,

(10)

because the real wage bundle has b1 , . . . , bn amounts of the first n commodities. Bringing the n + 1 equations together and writing in matrix form, we
get

  
1
0
···
0
0
a11
 −a21 1 − a22 · · ·


−a2n −b2   a12 




..
..
..
..  =  .. 
µ1 µ2 · · · µn µn+1  ...


.
.
.
.   . 


−an1 −an2 · · · 1 − ann −bn  a1n 
−L1
−L2 · · ·
−Ln
1
b1
(11)
which can be used to solve for nontrivial solutions of µ because, in general,
the matrix multiplying µ on the left hand side is invertible and the coefficient
vector on the right hand side is not the zero vector.
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One can be more specific. As long as the augmented input matrix, M =
A + bL, is productive, (11) has a well-defined solution given by,
µ̃1 = (1 − µ1 ) M1. (I − M )−1 ,

(12)

where µ̃1 is the 1 × n vector formed from the first n elements of µ, the
subscript 1 in µ̃1 is meant to indicate that this vector of S-values come from
implementing the first intuition about value, and M1. is the first row of M .
Moreover, one can show that µ1 < 1, which then leads to the claim that steel
is exploited (Roemer, 1982, Appendix 6.1).
4.2.3

Steel Value: Second Intuition

Let us now revisit the equations that determine S-value of commodities and
look at them using the second intuition: value of one unit of the output is
equal to the sum of the value transferred from the non-labour inputs used
up, and value added by the use of labour-power, in producing 1 unit of the
commodity. For j = 1, 2, . . . , n, a1j units of the first commodity, a2j amount
of the second commodity, . . ., anj amount of the n-th commodity, and Lj
units of labour-power are needed to produce 1 unit of the j-th commodity.
Since each unit of commodity 1 has a S-value of µ1 , a1j units of the first
commodity transfers µ1 a1j units of S-value to the output; similarly, each
unit of the second commodity has a steel value of µ2 , so that a2j amount of
the second commodity transfers µ2 a2j amount of S-value to the output, and
so on. Hence, for the first n commodities, we have
µj = (µ1 a1j + µ2 a2j + · · · + µn anj ) + µn+1 Lj + sj ,

j = 1, 2, . . . , n.

(13)

where, it is crucial to note, that sj > 0 is the surplus S-value generated in the
production process, so that the S-value added by labour-power, µn+1 Lj + sj ,
is greater than the S-value of labour-power, µn+1 Lj . To determine the exact
magnitude of surplus S-value generated, we can compare with the LHS (9)
and rearrange it as
µj = (µ1 a1j + µ2 a2j + · · · + µn anj ) + µn+1 Lj + a1j (1 − µ1 ) ,

(14)

which, in comparison with (13), shows that the magnitude of surplus S-value
is given by sj = a1j (1 − µ1 ). We see immediately that surplus S-value is
positive if and only if µ1 < 1. Let us ask, once again, the question as to
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which commodity adds this surplus S-value? Is it added by labour-power or
is it added by steel?
If we argue that the surplus S-value is added by labour-power then we
could implement the second intuition by writing (13) as,
µj = [µ1 a1j + µ2 a2j + · · · + µn anj ] + [µn+1 Lj + a1j (1 − µ1 )] ,
which shows that the S-value of 1 unit of the j-th commodity is equal to the
sum of S-value transferred by the non-labour inputs,
µ1 a1j + µ2 a2j + · · · + µn anj
and the S-value added by labour-power,
µn+1 Lj + a1j (1 − µ1 ) .
In this case we see that µ1 < 1 does not imply that steel is exploited. Since
labour-power adds the surplus S-value, we are justified in claiming, instead,
that labour is exploited (even though we express value in units of steel).
If, instead, we argue that the surplus S-value is added by steel, then we
could reconstruct (9) by rearranging (14) as follows: instead of attaching the
surplus S-value with the commodity labour-power, as we have done in (14),
if we instead add it to the commodity steel, i.e.
µj = [µ1 a1j + a1j (1 − µ1 )] + µ2 a2j + · · · + µn anj + µn+1 Lj ,

(15)

we get (9), because the term in the square brackets in (15) is a1j . In this
case we see that µ1 < 1 implies that steel is exploited. But this rests on
the same category error that we have identified in the case of F-value: the
claim that steel is exploited rests on moving the surplus S-value generated
by labour-power and adding it up with the S-value transferred by steel. The
same category error that I identified in Gintis and Bowles (1981) is in play
in Roemer (1982, Appendix 6.1).

4.3

Commodity Exploitation: Conceptual Problem

What is the conceptual problem with trying to establish commodity exploitation? As a technical matter, there is no problem with defining something
called ‘food value’ or ‘steel value’ - as done by Gintis and Bowles (1981) or
by Roemer (1982, Appendix 6.1). Following these scholars, one can certainly
17

define something called food value or steel value, if one so wishes. One can
write equations to determine these values and show that the equation system
can be solved to get a positive number for such values. One can then also
demonstrate that the food (steel) value of food (steel) is less than 1. So far
there is no problem - it is just a technical matter of defining an odd quantity
called food (steel) value and then solving a system of equations.
When the finding that the food (steel) value of food (steel) is less than 1
is used to conclude that food (steel) is exploited, it is then that a conceptual
error creeps into the argument. This is because the food (steel) value of food
(steel) being less than 1 rests on positive exploitation of labour, i.e. on the
fact that the food (steel) value added by labour-power is greater than the
food (steel) value of labour-power. Only by an accounting trick is the surplus
value generated by the use of labour-power added to the food (steel) value
transferred by food (steel). Thus, even when the food (steel) value of food
(steel) is less than 1, it is still labour that is exploited. Food (steel) is not
exploited.
The source of this conceptual problem, as I see it, is associated with the
attempt to treat labour-power symmetrically with all other commodities,
i.e. to fail to distinguish between labour-power and all other commodities.
Labour-power is the capacity to do useful work; labour is the outcome when
that capacity is used. As a qualitative matter, no such distinction can exist
for any other commodity, including food (steel). It is meaningless to try
to define ‘food-power’ (‘steel-power’) as distinct from food (steel). This is
because the capacity of food (steel) to be used is not distinct from the commodity food (steel) itself. Food, or any other commodity, does not have the
will, consciousness or incentive to resist its use in whatsoever way its possessor wants. In the case of labour-power that is not the case. The possessor
of labour-power, the worker, can and does, resist the way her employer, the
capitalist, uses her labouring capacity. Hence, while it is meaningful to distinguish labour-power (the labouring capacity) from labour, it is meaningless
to do so for any other commodity. And only because it is meaningful to distinguish between labour-power and labour, does it make sense to claim that
there can be a difference between the value of labour-power and the value
added by the use of labour-power. In the case of any commodity other than
labour-power, such a claim cannot be sustained.
Gintis and Bowles (1981, pp. 7) would not agree with this argument
because for them it is meaningful to define something called ‘lathe-power’ of
the commodity lathe.
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But clearly every commodity has an abstract form as a commodity and a concrete form as a physical entity engaged in production.
A lathe can be considered a union of lathe-power, its abstract potential to perform useful functions, and as lathing, the concrete
activity of the lathe engaged in production. (Gintis and Bowles,
1981, pp. 7).
As a logical and philosophical statement, the above assertion might be correct.
But in terms of political economy and social analysis, the difference between
lathe-power and lathe only makes sense if by purchasing the former, i.e. lathepower, the capitalist does not automatically get the latter, lathing. But that
is clearly impossible unless we are ready to impute consciousness and will to
the lathe.
The point to note is that there is a fundamental difference between lathepower and labour-power. The difference relates to the latter being a capacity
of a human being and the former being the abstract capacity of an inanimate
object. The difference between a human being and an inanimate object comes
from the will and consciousness possessed by the former, which is absent in
the latter. Hence the attempt to use lathe-power in a parallel way to the
concept of labour-power does not stand scrutiny.
From a quantitative angle, when we worked with the LTV we had used
the fact that labour, the input in production, has no value, but labour-power,
the commodity purchased by the capitalist, does have value, and moreover
that, the value added by labour was greater than the value of labour-power.
To repeat this logic in the case of food (steel), we would have to say that
food (steel), as an input in production, has no food (steel) value, but food
(steel), as the commodity purchased by the capitalist, does have food (steel)
value. Furthermore, we would have to assert that each unit of food (steel),
used as an input in production, adds more food (steel) value than the food
(steel) value of each unit of food (steel) that was purchased by the capitalist.
Clearly, these are absurd propositions - because we are talking about the same
entity, food (steel), in both cases. No wonder then that the whole attempt
to claim that commodities can be exploited leads to conceptual conundrums.

5

Conclusion

The Marxian labour theory of value is built on the premise that labour
is the only substance of value. This understanding comes from a deeper
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understanding of the role of labour in the history of humankind, and of the
role of the process of exchange in enforcing a social division of labour in a
society of independent, private producers. After developing it, the labour
theory of value is used by Marx to demonstrate the exploitative nature of
capitalism.
A strand of Marxist thinking, which I will call Analytical Marxist for
lack of a better term, developed a whole set of arguments in the 1970s and
1980s that was interpreted as raising serious doubts on the labour theory
of value. One argument in this broader class of Analytical Marxist thinking
advanced two claims, first, that any basic commodity can be used to construct
a consistent theory of value, and second, that such a value theory will show
that, in a capitalist economy, the basic commodity (which is the substance
of value) is exploited (Gintis and Bowles, 1981; Roemer, 1982).
In this paper, I have argued that both claims are based on elementary
conceptual flaws, and once those flaws are dealt with, the theory collapses.
The conceptual flaws are: (a) the failure to distinguish labour and labourpower (which underpins the first claim); and (b) the inability to distinguish
between the commodity labour-power and all other commodities (which underpins the second claim).
My argument is two fold. First, once we distinguish between labour-power
and labour, it is no longer possible to demonstrate that there are basics other
than labour in the sense defined by Gintis and Bowles (1981). Hence, the
claim that we can construct a theory of value on the basis of some basic other
than labour is no longer valid. Second, once we distinguish between labourpower (the human capacity to do useful work) and all other commodities,
it is no longer possible to claim that surplus value can be generated by
commodities other than labour-power. Hence, the claim that commodities
are exploited becomes invalid. One way to avoid these conceptual errors is
to use the Marxian labour theory of value.
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